mac80211: minor code cleanups

Nothing very interesting, some checkpatch inspired stuff,
some other things.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>

net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c

@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
 	p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n DTKN:");
 	for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
 		p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
-			sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_rx[i]?
+			sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_rx[i] ?
 			sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i]->dialog_token : 0);
 
 	p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n TX  :");
@@ -148,13 +148,13 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
 	p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n DTKN:");
 	for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
 		p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
-			sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i]?
+			sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i] ?
 			sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->dialog_token : 0);
 
 	p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n SSN :");
 	for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
 		p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
-			sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i]?
+			sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i] ?
 			sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->ssn : 0);
 
 	p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n");

net/mac80211/main.c

@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ static int __init ieee80211_init(void)
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct ieee80211_tx_info) > sizeof(skb->cb));
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct ieee80211_tx_info, driver_data) +
-	             IEEE80211_TX_INFO_DRIVER_DATA_SIZE > sizeof(skb->cb));
+		     IEEE80211_TX_INFO_DRIVER_DATA_SIZE > sizeof(skb->cb));
 
 	ret = rc80211_minstrel_init();
 	if (ret)

net/mac80211/mesh.c

@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static void ieee80211_mesh_rx_bcn_presp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 					size_t len,
 					struct ieee80211_rx_status *rx_status)
 {
-	struct ieee80211_local *local= sdata->local;
+	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
 	struct ieee802_11_elems elems;
 	struct ieee80211_channel *channel;
 	u64 supp_rates = 0;

net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
 
 /* Arithmetic right shift for positive and negative values for ISO C. */
 #define RC_PID_DO_ARITH_RIGHT_SHIFT(x, y) \
-	(x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y)
+	((x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y))
 
 enum rc_pid_event_type {
 	RC_PID_EVENT_TYPE_TX_STATUS,

net/mac80211/rx.c

@@ -26,10 +26,11 @@
 #include "tkip.h"
 #include "wme.h"
 
-u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
-				struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
-				struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num,
-				int bar_req);
+static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+					   struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   u16 mpdu_seq_num,
+					   int bar_req);
 /*
  * monitor mode reception
  *
@@ -1988,17 +1989,17 @@ static void __ieee80211_rx_handle_packet(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
 
 static inline int seq_less(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
 {
-	return (((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1));
+	return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1);
 }
 
 static inline u16 seq_inc(u16 sq)
 {
-	return ((sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK);
+	return (sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK;
 }
 
 static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
 {
-	return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK);
+	return (sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK;
 }
 
 
@@ -2006,10 +2007,11 @@ static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
  * As it function blongs to Rx path it must be called with
  * the proper rcu_read_lock protection for its flow.
  */
-u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
-				struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
-				struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num,
-				int bar_req)
+static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+					   struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   u16 mpdu_seq_num,
+					   int bar_req)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
 	struct ieee80211_rx_status status;

net/mac80211/sta_info.c

@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ int sta_info_insert(struct sta_info *sta)
 	}
 
 	if (WARN_ON(compare_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr, sdata->dev->dev_addr) == 0 ||
-	            is_multicast_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr))) {
+		    is_multicast_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr))) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_free;
 	}
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ void ieee80211_sta_expire(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 }
 
 struct ieee80211_sta *ieee80211_find_sta(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
-                                         const u8 *addr)
+					 const u8 *addr)
 {
 	struct sta_info *sta = sta_info_get(hw_to_local(hw), addr);
 

net/mac80211/wep.c

@@ -49,17 +49,19 @@ void ieee80211_wep_free(struct ieee80211_local *local)
 	crypto_free_blkcipher(local->wep_rx_tfm);
 }
 
-static inline int ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)
+static inline bool ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)
 {
-	/* Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the
+	/*
+	 * Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the
 	 * key scheduling algorithm of RC4. At least IVs (KeyByte + 3,
-	 * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them. */
+	 * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them.
+	 */
 	if ((iv & 0xff00) == 0xff00) {
 		u8 B = (iv >> 16) & 0xff;
 		if (B >= 3 && B < 3 + keylen)
-			return 1;
+			return true;
 	}
-	return 0;
+	return false;
 }
 
 
@@ -268,7 +270,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
 }
 
 
-u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
+bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 	unsigned int hdrlen;
@@ -276,16 +278,13 @@ u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
 	u32 iv;
 
 	if (!ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control))
-		return NULL;
+		return false;
 
 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 	ivpos = skb->data + hdrlen;
 	iv = (ivpos[0] << 16) | (ivpos[1] << 8) | ivpos[2];
 
-	if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen))
-		return ivpos;
-
-	return NULL;
+	return ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen);
 }
 
 ieee80211_rx_result
@@ -329,6 +328,8 @@ static int wep_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 ieee80211_tx_result
 ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 {
+	int i;
+
 	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 
 	if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->skb) < 0) {
@@ -337,9 +338,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 	}
 
 	if (tx->extra_frag) {
-		int i;
 		for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
-			if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0) {
+			if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i])) {
 				I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->
 					       tx_handlers_drop_wep);
 				return TX_DROP;

net/mac80211/wep.h

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			  struct ieee80211_key *key);
 int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			  struct ieee80211_key *key);
-u8 *ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key);
+bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key);
 
 ieee80211_rx_result
 ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx);

net/mac80211/wpa.c

@@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 	    !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) &&
 	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) &&
 	    !wpa_test) {
-		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for Michael MIC
-		 */
+		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for MMIC */
 		return TX_CONTINUE;
 	}
 
@@ -67,8 +66,6 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 #else
 	authenticator = 1;
 #endif
-	/* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key
-	 * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */
 	key_offset = authenticator ?
 		NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY :
 		NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY;
@@ -91,9 +88,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
 	int authenticator = 1, wpa_test = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it
-	 */
+	/* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it */
 	if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED)
 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 
@@ -115,8 +110,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 #else
 	authenticator = 1;
 #endif
-	/* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key
-	 * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */
 	key_offset = authenticator ?
 		NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY :
 		NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY;
@@ -201,6 +194,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result
 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
+	int i;
 
 	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 
@@ -208,9 +202,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 		return TX_DROP;
 
 	if (tx->extra_frag) {
-		int i;
 		for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
-			if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0)
+			if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]))
 				return TX_DROP;
 		}
 	}
@@ -348,7 +341,7 @@ static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
 }
 
 
-static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
+static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
 {
 	pn[0] = hdr[7];
 	pn[1] = hdr[6];
@@ -356,7 +349,6 @@ static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
 	pn[3] = hdr[4];
 	pn[4] = hdr[1];
 	pn[5] = hdr[0];
-	return (hdr[3] >> 6) & 0x03;
 }
 
 
@@ -371,7 +363,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) &&
 	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
-		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP "
+		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP
 		 * header or MIC fields */
 		info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf;
 		return 0;
@@ -424,6 +416,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result
 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
+	int i;
 
 	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 
@@ -431,9 +424,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 		return TX_DROP;
 
 	if (tx->extra_frag) {
-		int i;
 		for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
-			if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0)
+			if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]))
 				return TX_DROP;
 		}
 	}
@@ -465,7 +457,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	    (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 
-	(void) ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
+	ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
 
 	if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
 		key->u.ccmp.replays++;
@@ -480,9 +472,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 			    key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf,
 			    skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
 			    skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
-			    skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN)) {
+			    skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-		}
 	}
 
 	memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);