Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (26 commits)
  selinux: include vmalloc.h for vmalloc_user
  secmark: fix config problem when CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK is not set
  selinux: implement mmap on /selinux/policy
  SELinux: allow userspace to read policy back out of the kernel
  SELinux: drop useless (and incorrect) AVTAB_MAX_SIZE
  SELinux: deterministic ordering of range transition rules
  kernel: roundup should only reference arguments once
  kernel: rounddown helper function
  secmark: export secctx, drop secmark in procfs
  conntrack: export lsm context rather than internal secid via netlink
  security: secid_to_secctx returns len when data is NULL
  secmark: make secmark object handling generic
  secmark: do not return early if there was no error
  AppArmor: Ensure the size of the copy is < the buffer allocated to hold it
  TOMOYO: Print URL information before panic().
  security: remove unused parameter from security_task_setscheduler()
  tpm: change 'tpm_suspend_pcr' to be module parameter
  selinux: fix up style problem on /selinux/status
  selinux: change to new flag variable
  selinux: really fix dependency causing parallel compile failure.
  ...

arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
 	if (!check_same_owner(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	retval = security_task_setscheduler(p, 0, NULL);
+	retval = security_task_setscheduler(p)
 	if (retval)
 		goto out_unlock;
 

drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c

@@ -47,6 +47,16 @@ enum tpm_duration {
 #define TPM_MAX_PROTECTED_ORDINAL 12
 #define TPM_PROTECTED_ORDINAL_MASK 0xFF
 
+/*
+ * Bug workaround - some TPM's don't flush the most
+ * recently changed pcr on suspend, so force the flush
+ * with an extend to the selected _unused_ non-volatile pcr.
+ */
+static int tpm_suspend_pcr;
+module_param_named(suspend_pcr, tpm_suspend_pcr, uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(suspend_pcr,
+		 "PCR to use for dummy writes to faciltate flush on suspend.");
+
 static LIST_HEAD(tpm_chip_list);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(driver_lock);
 static DECLARE_BITMAP(dev_mask, TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
@@ -1077,18 +1087,6 @@ static struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
 	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE
 };
 
-/* Bug workaround - some TPM's don't flush the most
- * recently changed pcr on suspend, so force the flush
- * with an extend to the selected _unused_ non-volatile pcr.
- */
-static int tpm_suspend_pcr;
-static int __init tpm_suspend_setup(char *str)
-{
-	get_option(&str, &tpm_suspend_pcr);
-	return 1;
-}
-__setup("tpm_suspend_pcr=", tpm_suspend_setup);
-
 /*
  * We are about to suspend. Save the TPM state
  * so that it can be restored.

include/linux/kernel.h

@@ -58,7 +58,18 @@ extern const char linux_proc_banner[];
 
 #define FIELD_SIZEOF(t, f) (sizeof(((t*)0)->f))
 #define DIV_ROUND_UP(n,d) (((n) + (d) - 1) / (d))
-#define roundup(x, y) ((((x) + ((y) - 1)) / (y)) * (y))
+#define roundup(x, y) (					\
+{							\
+	typeof(y) __y = y;				\
+	(((x) + (__y - 1)) / __y) * __y;		\
+}							\
+)
+#define rounddown(x, y) (				\
+{							\
+	typeof(x) __x = (x);				\
+	__x - (__x % (y));				\
+}							\
+)
 #define DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(x, divisor)(			\
 {							\
 	typeof(divisor) __divisor = divisor;		\

include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink_conntrack.h

@@ -39,8 +39,9 @@ enum ctattr_type {
 	CTA_TUPLE_MASTER,
 	CTA_NAT_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG,
 	CTA_NAT_SEQ_ADJ_REPLY,
-	CTA_SECMARK,
+	CTA_SECMARK,		/* obsolete */
 	CTA_ZONE,
+	CTA_SECCTX,
 	__CTA_MAX
 };
 #define CTA_MAX (__CTA_MAX - 1)
@@ -172,4 +173,11 @@ enum ctattr_help {
 };
 #define CTA_HELP_MAX (__CTA_HELP_MAX - 1)
 
+enum ctattr_secctx {
+	CTA_SECCTX_UNSPEC,
+	CTA_SECCTX_NAME,
+	__CTA_SECCTX_MAX
+};
+#define CTA_SECCTX_MAX (__CTA_SECCTX_MAX - 1)
+
 #endif /* _IPCONNTRACK_NETLINK_H */

include/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h

@@ -11,18 +11,12 @@
  * packets are being marked for.
  */
 #define SECMARK_MODE_SEL	0x01		/* SELinux */
-#define SECMARK_SELCTX_MAX	256
-
-struct xt_secmark_target_selinux_info {
-	__u32 selsid;
-	char selctx[SECMARK_SELCTX_MAX];
-};
+#define SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX	256
 
 struct xt_secmark_target_info {
 	__u8 mode;
-	union {
-		struct xt_secmark_target_selinux_info sel;
-	} u;
+	__u32 secid;
+	char secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX];
 };
 
 #endif /*_XT_SECMARK_H_target */

include/linux/security.h

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ extern int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 extern int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags);
 extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			  unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
-extern int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
+extern int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
 extern int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 extern int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 extern int cap_syslog(int type, bool from_file);
@@ -959,6 +959,12 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid.
  * @inet_conn_established:
  *	Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
+ * @secmark_relabel_packet:
+ *	check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to the given secid
+ * @security_secmark_refcount_inc
+ *	tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
+ * @security_secmark_refcount_dec
+ *	tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
  * @req_classify_flow:
  *	Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
  * @tun_dev_create:
@@ -1279,9 +1285,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  *
  * @secid_to_secctx:
- *	Convert secid to security context.
+ *	Convert secid to security context.  If secdata is NULL the length of
+ *	the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned.
+ *	This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the
+ *	length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the secdata.
  *	@secid contains the security ID.
  *	@secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security context.
+ *	@seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
  * @secctx_to_secid:
  *	Convert security context to secid.
  *	@secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
@@ -1501,8 +1511,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*task_getioprio) (struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_setrlimit) (struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 			struct rlimit *new_rlim);
-	int (*task_setscheduler) (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
-				  struct sched_param *lp);
+	int (*task_setscheduler) (struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_getscheduler) (struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_movememory) (struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_kill) (struct task_struct *p,
@@ -1594,6 +1603,9 @@ struct security_operations {
 				  struct request_sock *req);
 	void (*inet_csk_clone) (struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);
 	void (*inet_conn_established) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+	int (*secmark_relabel_packet) (u32 secid);
+	void (*secmark_refcount_inc) (void);
+	void (*secmark_refcount_dec) (void);
 	void (*req_classify_flow) (const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
 	int (*tun_dev_create)(void);
 	void (*tun_dev_post_create)(struct sock *sk);
@@ -1752,8 +1764,7 @@ int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 		struct rlimit *new_rlim);
-int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
-				int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
+int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
@@ -2320,11 +2331,9 @@ static inline int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
-					     int policy,
-					     struct sched_param *lp)
+static inline int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	return cap_task_setscheduler(p);
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
@@ -2551,6 +2560,9 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 			const struct request_sock *req);
 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 			struct sk_buff *skb);
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid);
+void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
+void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
 int security_tun_dev_create(void);
 void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk);
 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk);
@@ -2705,6 +2717,19 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 {
 }
 
+static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+}
+
 static inline int security_tun_dev_create(void)
 {
 	return 0;

include/linux/selinux.h

@@ -20,75 +20,12 @@ struct kern_ipc_perm;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
 
-/**
- *     selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a security ID
- *     @str: the security context string to be mapped
- *     @sid: ID value returned via this.
- *
- *     Returns 0 if successful, with the SID stored in sid.  A value
- *     of zero for sid indicates no SID could be determined (but no error
- *     occurred).
- */
-int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
- *     selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission - secmark permission check
- *     @sid: SECMARK ID value to be applied to network packet
- *
- *     Returns 0 if the current task is allowed to set the SECMARK label of
- *     packets with the supplied security ID.  Note that it is implicit that
- *     the packet is always being relabeled from the default unlabeled value,
- *     and that the access control decision is made in the AVC.
- */
-int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid);
-
-/**
- *     selinux_secmark_refcount_inc - increments the secmark use counter
- *
- *     SELinux keeps track of the current SECMARK targets in use so it knows
- *     when to apply SECMARK label access checks to network packets.  This
- *     function incements this reference count to indicate that a new SECMARK
- *     target has been configured.
- */
-void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
-
-/**
- *     selinux_secmark_refcount_dec - decrements the secmark use counter
- *
- *     SELinux keeps track of the current SECMARK targets in use so it knows
- *     when to apply SECMARK label access checks to network packets.  This
- *     function decements this reference count to indicate that one of the
- *     existing SECMARK targets has been removed/flushed.
- */
-void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
-
 /**
  * selinux_is_enabled - is SELinux enabled?
  */
 bool selinux_is_enabled(void);
 #else
 
-static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
-{
-       *sid = 0;
-       return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
 static inline bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
 {
 	return false;

kernel/cpuset.c

@@ -1397,7 +1397,7 @@ static int cpuset_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, struct cgroup *cont,
 	if (tsk->flags & PF_THREAD_BOUND)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	ret = security_task_setscheduler(tsk, 0, NULL);
+	ret = security_task_setscheduler(tsk);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	if (threadgroup) {
@@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ static int cpuset_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, struct cgroup *cont,
 
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &tsk->thread_group, thread_group) {
-			ret = security_task_setscheduler(c, 0, NULL);
+			ret = security_task_setscheduler(c);
 			if (ret) {
 				rcu_read_unlock();
 				return ret;

kernel/sched.c

@@ -4645,7 +4645,7 @@ recheck:
 	}
 
 	if (user) {
-		retval = security_task_setscheduler(p, policy, param);
+		retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);
 		if (retval)
 			return retval;
 	}
@@ -4887,7 +4887,7 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *in_mask)
 	if (!check_same_owner(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	retval = security_task_setscheduler(p, 0, NULL);
+	retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);
 	if (retval)
 		goto out_unlock;
 

net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
@@ -87,6 +88,29 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
+static int ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+	int ret;
+	u32 len;
+	char *secctx;
+
+	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+
+	security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+	return ret;
+}
+#else
+static inline int ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *hash = v;
@@ -148,10 +172,8 @@ static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 		goto release;
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
-	if (seq_printf(s, "secmark=%u ", ct->secmark))
+	if (ct_show_secctx(s, ct))
 		goto release;
-#endif
 
 	if (seq_printf(s, "use=%u\n", atomic_read(&ct->ct_general.use)))
 		goto release;

net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/rculist_nulls.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/timer.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
@@ -245,16 +246,31 @@ nla_put_failure:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
 static inline int
-ctnetlink_dump_secmark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
+ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 {
-	NLA_PUT_BE32(skb, CTA_SECMARK, htonl(ct->secmark));
-	return 0;
+	struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
+	int len, ret;
+	char *secctx;
+
+	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = -1;
+	nest_secctx = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_SECCTX | NLA_F_NESTED);
+	if (!nest_secctx)
+		goto nla_put_failure;
+
+	NLA_PUT_STRING(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx);
+	nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
 
+	ret = 0;
 nla_put_failure:
-	return -1;
+	security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+	return ret;
 }
 #else
-#define ctnetlink_dump_secmark(a, b) (0)
+#define ctnetlink_dump_secctx(a, b) (0)
 #endif
 
 #define master_tuple(ct) &(ct->master->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple)
@@ -391,7 +407,7 @@ ctnetlink_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid, u32 seq,
 	    ctnetlink_dump_protoinfo(skb, ct) < 0 ||
 	    ctnetlink_dump_helpinfo(skb, ct) < 0 ||
 	    ctnetlink_dump_mark(skb, ct) < 0 ||
-	    ctnetlink_dump_secmark(skb, ct) < 0 ||
+	    ctnetlink_dump_secctx(skb, ct) < 0 ||
 	    ctnetlink_dump_id(skb, ct) < 0 ||
 	    ctnetlink_dump_use(skb, ct) < 0 ||
 	    ctnetlink_dump_master(skb, ct) < 0 ||
@@ -437,6 +453,17 @@ ctnetlink_counters_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
 	       ;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
+static int ctnetlink_nlmsg_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+	int len;
+
+	security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+
+	return sizeof(char) * len;
+}
+#endif
+
 static inline size_t
 ctnetlink_nlmsg_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
 {
@@ -453,7 +480,8 @@ ctnetlink_nlmsg_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
 	       + nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_HELP */
 	       + nla_total_size(NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN) /* CTA_HELP_NAME */
 #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
-	       + nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_SECMARK */
+	       + nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
+	       + nla_total_size(ctnetlink_nlmsg_secctx_size(ct)) /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED
 	       + 2 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_NAT_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG|REPL */
@@ -556,7 +584,7 @@ ctnetlink_conntrack_event(unsigned int events, struct nf_ct_event *item)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
 		if ((events & (1 << IPCT_SECMARK) || ct->secmark)
-		    && ctnetlink_dump_secmark(skb, ct) < 0)
+		    && ctnetlink_dump_secctx(skb, ct) < 0)
 			goto nla_put_failure;
 #endif
 

net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
@@ -108,6 +109,29 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
+static int ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+	int ret;
+	u32 len;
+	char *secctx;
+
+	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+
+	security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+	return ret;
+}
+#else
+static inline int ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 /* return 0 on success, 1 in case of error */
 static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
@@ -168,10 +192,8 @@ static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 		goto release;
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
-	if (seq_printf(s, "secmark=%u ", ct->secmark))
+	if (ct_show_secctx(s, ct))
 		goto release;
-#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES
 	if (seq_printf(s, "zone=%u ", nf_ct_zone(ct)))

net/netfilter/xt_CT.c

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6_tables.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/x_tables.h>

net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
  */
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/x_tables.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h>
 
@@ -39,9 +39,8 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
 
 	switch (mode) {
 	case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
-		secmark = info->u.sel.selsid;
+		secmark = info->secid;
 		break;
-
 	default:
 		BUG();
 	}
@@ -50,33 +49,33 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
 	return XT_CONTINUE;
 }
 
-static int checkentry_selinux(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
+static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
 {
 	int err;
-	struct xt_secmark_target_selinux_info *sel = &info->u.sel;
 
-	sel->selctx[SECMARK_SELCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
+	info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
+	info->secid = 0;
 
-	err = selinux_string_to_sid(sel->selctx, &sel->selsid);
+	err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
+				       &info->secid);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EINVAL)
-			pr_info("invalid SELinux context \'%s\'\n",
-				sel->selctx);
+			pr_info("invalid security context \'%s\'\n", info->secctx);
 		return err;
 	}
 
-	if (!sel->selsid) {
-		pr_info("unable to map SELinux context \'%s\'\n", sel->selctx);
+	if (!info->secid) {
+		pr_info("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n", info->secctx);
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
-	err = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(sel->selsid);
+	err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(info->secid);
 	if (err) {
 		pr_info("unable to obtain relabeling permission\n");
 		return err;
 	}
 
-	selinux_secmark_refcount_inc();
+	security_secmark_refcount_inc();
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -100,16 +99,16 @@ static int secmark_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par)
 
 	switch (info->mode) {
 	case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
-		err = checkentry_selinux(info);
-		if (err <= 0)
-			return err;
 		break;
-
 	default:
 		pr_info("invalid mode: %hu\n", info->mode);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = checkentry_lsm(info);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	if (!mode)
 		mode = info->mode;
 	return 0;
@@ -119,7 +118,7 @@ static void secmark_tg_destroy(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par)
 {
 	switch (mode) {
 	case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
-		selinux_secmark_refcount_dec();
+		security_secmark_refcount_dec();
 	}
 }
 

security/apparmor/.gitignore

@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@
 #
 af_names.h
 capability_names.h
+rlim_names.h

security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
  * aa_simple_write_to_buffer - common routine for getting policy from user
  * @op: operation doing the user buffer copy
  * @userbuf: user buffer to copy data from  (NOT NULL)
- * @alloc_size: size of user buffer
+ * @alloc_size: size of user buffer (REQUIRES: @alloc_size >= @copy_size)
  * @copy_size: size of data to copy from user buffer
  * @pos: position write is at in the file (NOT NULL)
  *
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ static char *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(int op, const char __user *userbuf,
 {
 	char *data;
 
+	BUG_ON(copy_size > alloc_size);
+
 	if (*pos != 0)
 		/* only writes from pos 0, that is complete writes */
 		return ERR_PTR(-ESPIPE);

security/capability.c

@@ -677,7 +677,18 @@ static void cap_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 }
 
+static int cap_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 
+static void cap_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+}
+
+static void cap_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+}
 
 static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
 				  struct flowi *fl)
@@ -777,7 +788,8 @@ static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 
 static int cap_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	*secid = 0;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
@@ -1018,6 +1030,9 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_request);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_relabel_packet);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_inc);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_dec);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_create);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_post_create);

security/commoncap.c

@@ -719,14 +719,11 @@ static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
 /**
  * cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted
  * @p: The task to affect
- * @policy: The policy to effect
- * @lp: The parameters to the scheduling policy
  *
  * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
  * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
  */
-int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
-			   struct sched_param *lp)
+int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
 	return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }

security/security.c

@@ -89,20 +89,12 @@ __setup("security=", choose_lsm);
  * Return true if:
  *	-The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
  *	-or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
- *	 choose an alternate LSM at boot time,
- *	-or there is no default LSM set and the user didn't specify a
- *	 specific LSM and we're the first to ask for registration permission,
- *	-or the passed LSM is currently loaded.
+ *	 choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
  * Otherwise, return false.
  */
 int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
-	if (!*chosen_lsm)
-		strncpy(chosen_lsm, ops->name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
-	else if (strncmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm, SECURITY_NAME_MAX))
-		return 0;
-
-	return 1;
+	return !strcmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -786,10 +778,9 @@ int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 	return security_ops->task_setrlimit(p, resource, new_rlim);
 }
 
-int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
-				int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
+int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	return security_ops->task_setscheduler(p);
 }
 
 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
@@ -1145,6 +1136,24 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 	security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb);
 }
 
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+{
+	return security_ops->secmark_relabel_packet(secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
+
+void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+	security_ops->secmark_refcount_inc();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
+
+void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+	security_ops->secmark_refcount_dec();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
+
 int security_tun_dev_create(void)
 {
 	return security_ops->tun_dev_create();

security/selinux/Makefile

@@ -2,25 +2,20 @@
 # Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree.
 #
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/
-
-selinux-y := avc.o \
-	     hooks.o \
-	     selinuxfs.o \
-	     netlink.o \
-	     nlmsgtab.o \
-	     netif.o \
-	     netnode.o \
-	     netport.o \
-	     exports.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o
+
+selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
+	     netnode.o netport.o exports.o \
+	     ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
+	     ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/status.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
 
-EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
+ccflags-y := -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
 
-$(obj)/avc.o: $(obj)/flask.h
+$(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
 
 quiet_cmd_flask = GEN     $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
       cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h

security/selinux/exports.c

@@ -11,58 +11,9 @@
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  */
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/ipc.h>
-#include <asm/atomic.h>
 
 #include "security.h"
-#include "objsec.h"
-
-/* SECMARK reference count */
-extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount;
-
-int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
-{
-	if (selinux_enabled)
-		return security_context_to_sid(str, strlen(str), sid);
-	else {
-		*sid = 0;
-		return 0;
-	}
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_string_to_sid);
-
-int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
-{
-	if (selinux_enabled) {
-		const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
-		u32 tsid;
-
-		__tsec = current_security();
-		tsid = __tsec->sid;
-
-		return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
-				    PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission);
-
-void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
-{
-	atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_inc);
-
-void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
-{
-	atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_dec);
 
 bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
 {

security/selinux/hooks.c

@@ -3354,11 +3354,11 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
+static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -4279,6 +4279,27 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
 }
 
+static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+	u32 tsid;
+
+	__tsec = current_security();
+	tsid = __tsec->sid;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
 				      struct flowi *fl)
 {
@@ -5533,6 +5554,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inet_conn_request =		selinux_inet_conn_request,
 	.inet_csk_clone =		selinux_inet_csk_clone,
 	.inet_conn_established =	selinux_inet_conn_established,
+	.secmark_relabel_packet =	selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
+	.secmark_refcount_inc =		selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
+	.secmark_refcount_dec =		selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
 	.req_classify_flow =		selinux_req_classify_flow,
 	.tun_dev_create =		selinux_tun_dev_create,
 	.tun_dev_post_create = 		selinux_tun_dev_post_create,

security/selinux/include/classmap.h

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	  { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member",
 	    "check_context", "load_policy", "compute_relabel",
 	    "compute_user", "setenforce", "setbool", "setsecparam",
-	    "setcheckreqprot", NULL } },
+	    "setcheckreqprot", "read_policy", NULL } },
 	{ "process",
 	  { "fork", "transition", "sigchld", "sigkill",
 	    "sigstop", "signull", "signal", "ptrace", "getsched", "setsched",

security/selinux/include/security.h

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
 
 #include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
 #include "flask.h"
 
 #define SECSID_NULL			0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
@@ -82,6 +83,8 @@ extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 int security_mls_enabled(void);
 
 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len);
+int security_read_policy(void **data, ssize_t *len);
+size_t security_policydb_len(void);
 
 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
 
@@ -191,5 +194,25 @@ static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
 
 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid);
 
+/*
+ * status notifier using mmap interface
+ */
+extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void);
+
+#define SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION	1
+struct selinux_kernel_status {
+	u32	version;	/* version number of thie structure */
+	u32	sequence;	/* sequence number of seqlock logic */
+	u32	enforcing;	/* current setting of enforcing mode */
+	u32	policyload;	/* times of policy reloaded */
+	u32	deny_unknown;	/* current setting of deny_unknown */
+	/*
+	 * The version > 0 supports above members.
+	 */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing);
+extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
+
 #endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
 

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ static int *bool_pending_values;
 static struct dentry *class_dir;
 static unsigned long last_class_ino;
 
+static char policy_opened;
+
 /* global data for policy capabilities */
 static struct dentry *policycap_dir;
 
@@ -110,6 +112,8 @@ enum sel_inos {
 	SEL_COMPAT_NET,	/* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
 	SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown reject handling to userspace */
 	SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
+	SEL_STATUS,	/* export current status using mmap() */
+	SEL_POLICY,	/* allow userspace to read the in kernel policy */
 	SEL_INO_NEXT,	/* The next inode number to use */
 };
 
@@ -171,6 +175,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		if (selinux_enforcing)
 			avc_ss_reset(0);
 		selnl_notify_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
+		selinux_status_update_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
 	}
 	length = count;
 out:
@@ -205,6 +210,59 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page();
+
+	if (!status)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	filp->private_data = status;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_status(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct page    *status = filp->private_data;
+
+	BUG_ON(!status);
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos,
+				       page_address(status),
+				       sizeof(struct selinux_kernel_status));
+}
+
+static int sel_mmap_handle_status(struct file *filp,
+				  struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	struct page    *status = filp->private_data;
+	unsigned long	size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+
+	BUG_ON(!status);
+
+	/* only allows one page from the head */
+	if (vma->vm_pgoff > 0 || size != PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EIO;
+	/* disallow writable mapping */
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+		return -EPERM;
+	/* disallow mprotect() turns it into writable */
+	vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
+
+	return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start,
+			       page_to_pfn(status),
+			       size, vma->vm_page_prot);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_status_ops = {
+	.open		= sel_open_handle_status,
+	.read		= sel_read_handle_status,
+	.mmap		= sel_mmap_handle_status,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
 static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -296,6 +354,141 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+struct policy_load_memory {
+	size_t len;
+	void *data;
+};
+
+static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	BUG_ON(filp->private_data);
+
+	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+
+	rc = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = -EBUSY;
+	if (policy_opened)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	plm = kzalloc(sizeof(*plm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!plm)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len()) {
+		mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+		i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len());
+		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+	}
+
+	rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	policy_opened = 1;
+
+	filp->private_data = plm;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+
+	if (plm)
+		vfree(plm->data);
+	kfree(plm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+
+	BUG_ON(!plm);
+
+	policy_opened = 0;
+
+	vfree(plm->data);
+	kfree(plm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+	int ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+
+	ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				 struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = vma->vm_file->private_data;
+	unsigned long offset;
+	struct page *page;
+
+	if (vmf->flags & (FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE | FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	if (offset >= roundup(plm->len, PAGE_SIZE))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	page = vmalloc_to_page(plm->data + offset);
+	get_page(page);
+
+	vmf->page = page;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct vm_operations_struct sel_mmap_policy_ops = {
+	.fault = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+	.page_mkwrite = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+};
+
+int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
+		/* do not allow mprotect to make mapping writable */
+		vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
+
+		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+			return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED;
+	vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
+	.open		= sel_open_policy,
+	.read		= sel_read_policy,
+	.mmap		= sel_mmap_policy,
+	.release	= sel_release_policy,
+};
+
 static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 
@@ -1612,6 +1805,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 		[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
 		[SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUSR},
 		/* last one */ {""}
 	};
 	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);

security/selinux/ss/Makefile

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Makefile for building the SELinux security server as part of the kernel tree.
-#
-
-EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
-obj-y := ss.o
-
-ss-y := ebitmap.o hashtab.o symtab.o sidtab.o avtab.o policydb.o services.o conditional.o mls.o
-

security/selinux/ss/avtab.c

@@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
 	if (shift > 2)
 		shift = shift - 2;
 	nslot = 1 << shift;
-	if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_SIZE)
-		nslot = MAX_AVTAB_SIZE;
+	if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
+		nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
 	mask = nslot - 1;
 
 	h->htable = kcalloc(nslot, sizeof(*(h->htable)), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -501,6 +501,48 @@ bad:
 	goto out;
 }
 
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
+{
+	__le16 buf16[4];
+	__le32 buf32[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
+	buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
+	buf16[2] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_class);
+	buf16[3] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.specified);
+	rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.data);
+	rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(a->nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < a->nslot; i++) {
+		for (cur = a->htable[i]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+			rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
 void avtab_cache_init(void)
 {
 	avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",

security/selinux/ss/avtab.h

@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		    void *p);
 
 int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol);
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp);
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp);
 
 struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key,
 					  struct avtab_datum *datum);
@@ -85,7 +87,6 @@ void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 11
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK (MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
-#define MAX_AVTAB_SIZE MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
 
 #endif	/* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
 

security/selinux/ss/conditional.c

@@ -490,6 +490,129 @@ err:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+int cond_write_bool(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->value);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->state);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cond_write_cond_av_list doesn't write out the av_list nodes.
+ * Instead it writes out the key/value pairs from the avtab. This
+ * is necessary because there is no way to uniquely identifying rules
+ * in the avtab so it is not possible to associate individual rules
+ * in the avtab with a conditional without saving them as part of
+ * the conditional. This means that the avtab with the conditional
+ * rules will not be saved but will be rebuilt on policy load.
+ */
+static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p,
+			      struct cond_av_list *list, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	struct cond_av_list *cur_list;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = 0;
+	for (cur_list = list; cur_list != NULL; cur_list = cur_list->next)
+		len++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (cur_list = list; cur_list != NULL; cur_list = cur_list->next) {
+		rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur_list->node, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
+		    struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct cond_expr *cur_expr;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	int rc;
+	u32 len = 0;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->cur_state);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = cur_expr->next)
+		len++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = cur_expr->next) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur_expr->expr_type);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cur_expr->bool);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = cond_write_av_list(p, node->true_list, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = cond_write_av_list(p, node->false_list, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp)
+{
+	struct cond_node *cur;
+	u32 len;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	len = 0;
+	for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next)
+		len++;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = cond_write_node(p, cur, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
 /* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
  * av table, and if so, add them to the result
  */

security/selinux/ss/conditional.h

@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
 
 int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp);
 int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
 
 void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
 

security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
 #include "ebitmap.h"
 #include "policydb.h"
 
+#define BITS_PER_U64	(sizeof(u64) * 8)
+
 int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
 {
 	struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
@@ -363,10 +365,10 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 	e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 	count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
 
-	if (mapunit != sizeof(u64) * 8) {
+	if (mapunit != BITS_PER_U64) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
 		       "match my size %Zd (high bit was %d)\n",
-		       mapunit, sizeof(u64) * 8, e->highbit);
+		       mapunit, BITS_PER_U64, e->highbit);
 		goto bad;
 	}
 
@@ -446,3 +448,78 @@ bad:
 	ebitmap_destroy(e);
 	goto out;
 }
+
+int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n;
+	u32 count;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u64 map;
+	int bit, last_bit, last_startbit, rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(BITS_PER_U64);
+
+	count = 0;
+	last_bit = 0;
+	last_startbit = -1;
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+		if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+			count++;
+			last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+		}
+		last_bit = roundup(bit + 1, BITS_PER_U64);
+	}
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(last_bit);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(count);
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	map = 0;
+	last_startbit = INT_MIN;
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+		if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+			__le64 buf64[1];
+
+			/* this is the very first bit */
+			if (!map) {
+				last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+				map = (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* write the last node */
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+			rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			/* set up for the next node */
+			map = 0;
+			last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+		}
+		map |= (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+	}
+	/* write the last node */
+	if (map) {
+		__le64 buf64[1];
+
+		/* write the last node */
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+		rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}

security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h

@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
 int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
 void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
 int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,

security/selinux/ss/policydb.c

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include "policydb.h"
 #include "conditional.h"
 #include "mls.h"
+#include "services.h"
 
 #define _DEBUG_HASHES
 
@@ -185,9 +186,19 @@ static u32 rangetr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
 static int rangetr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
 {
 	const struct range_trans *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
-	return (key1->source_type != key2->source_type ||
-		key1->target_type != key2->target_type ||
-		key1->target_class != key2->target_class);
+	int v;
+
+	v = key1->source_type - key2->source_type;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = key1->target_type - key2->target_type;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = key1->target_class - key2->target_class;
+
+	return v;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1624,11 +1635,11 @@ static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 
 static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 {
-	struct type_datum *upper, *type;
+	struct type_datum *upper;
 	struct policydb *p = datap;
 	int depth = 0;
 
-	upper = type = datum;
+	upper = datum;
 	while (upper->bounds) {
 		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: "
@@ -2306,3 +2317,843 @@ bad:
 	policydb_destroy(p);
 	goto out;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS level structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_level(struct mls_level *l, void *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(l->sens);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&l->cat, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS range structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t items;
+	int rc, eq;
+
+	eq = mls_level_eq(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]);
+
+	if (eq)
+		items = 2;
+	else
+		items = 3;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(items-1);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[0].sens);
+	if (!eq)
+		buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[1].sens);
+
+	BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf)/sizeof(buf[0])));
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (!eq) {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(levdatum->isalias);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->value);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->isalias);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_trans_write(struct role_trans *r, void *fp)
+{
+	struct role_trans *tr;
+	u32 buf[3];
+	size_t nel;
+	int rc;
+
+	nel = 0;
+	for (tr = r; tr; tr = tr->next)
+		nel++;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	for (tr = r; tr; tr = tr->next) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->role);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(tr->type);
+		buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(tr->new_role);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, void *fp)
+{
+	struct role_allow *ra;
+	u32 buf[2];
+	size_t nel;
+	int rc;
+
+	nel = 0;
+	for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next)
+		nel++;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ra->role);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ra->new_role);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a security context structure
+ * to a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c,
+			 void *fp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->user);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->role);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->type);
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_write functions are used to
+ * write the symbol data to a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int perm_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum = datum;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(perdatum->value);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->value);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.nprim);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.table->nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
+			     void *fp)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *c;
+	struct constraint_expr *e;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 nel;
+	int rc;
+
+	for (c = node; c; c = c->next) {
+		nel = 0;
+		for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next)
+			nel++;
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->permissions);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next) {
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(e->expr_type);
+			buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(e->attr);
+			buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(e->op);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			switch (e->expr_type) {
+			case CEXPR_NAMES:
+				rc = ebitmap_write(&e->names, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	struct constraint_node *c;
+	__le32 buf[6];
+	u32 ncons;
+	size_t len, len2;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	if (cladatum->comkey)
+		len2 = strlen(cladatum->comkey);
+	else
+		len2 = 0;
+
+	ncons = 0;
+	for (c = cladatum->constraints; c; c = c->next)
+		ncons++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len2);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->value);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.nprim);
+	if (cladatum->permissions.table)
+		buf[4] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.table->nel);
+	else
+		buf[4] = 0;
+	buf[5] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 6, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (cladatum->comkey) {
+		rc = put_entry(cladatum->comkey, 1, len2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->constraints, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* write out the validatetrans rule */
+	ncons = 0;
+	for (c = cladatum->validatetrans; c; c = c->next)
+		ncons++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->validatetrans, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct role_datum *role = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t items, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	items = 0;
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->value);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->bounds);
+
+	BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf)/sizeof(buf[0])));
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&role->dominates, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&role->types, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	int rc;
+	size_t items, len;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	items = 0;
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->value);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
+		u32 properties = 0;
+
+		if (typdatum->primary)
+			properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY;
+
+		if (typdatum->attribute)
+			properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(properties);
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->bounds);
+	} else {
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->primary);
+	}
+	BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf) / sizeof(buf[0])));
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t items, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	items = 0;
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->value);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->bounds);
+	BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf) / sizeof(buf[0])));
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*write_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum,
+				void *datap) =
+{
+	common_write,
+	class_write,
+	role_write,
+	type_write,
+	user_write,
+	cond_write_bool,
+	sens_write,
+	cat_write,
+};
+
+static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+			  void *fp)
+{
+	unsigned int i, j, rc;
+	size_t nel, len;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 nodebuf[8];
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+		nel = 0;
+		for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next)
+			nel++;
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next) {
+			switch (i) {
+			case OCON_ISID:
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->sid[0]);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FS:
+			case OCON_NETIF:
+				len = strlen(c->u.name);
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[1], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_PORT:
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.protocol);
+				buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.low_port);
+				buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.high_port);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE:
+				nodebuf[0] = c->u.node.addr; /* network order */
+				nodebuf[1] = c->u.node.mask; /* network order */
+				rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FSUSE:
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.behavior);
+				len = strlen(c->u.name);
+				buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE6:
+				for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+					nodebuf[j] = c->u.node6.addr[j]; /* network order */
+				for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+					nodebuf[j + 4] = c->u.node6.mask[j]; /* network order */
+				rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 8, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct genfs *genfs;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	size_t len;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	len = 0;
+	for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next)
+		len++;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+		len = strlen(genfs->fstype);
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		rc = put_entry(genfs->fstype, 1, len, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		len = 0;
+		for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next)
+			len++;
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+			len = strlen(c->u.name);
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.sclass);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_count(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+	int *cnt = ptr;
+	*cnt = *cnt + 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	struct range_trans *rt = key;
+	struct mls_range *r = data;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->source_type);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_type);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_class);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	rc = mls_write_range_helper(r, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	size_t nel;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+	struct policy_data pd;
+
+	pd.p = p;
+	pd.fp = fp;
+
+	/* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
+	nel = 0;
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_count, &nel);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* actually write all of the entries */
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_write_helper, &pd);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the configuration data in a policy database
+ * structure to a policy database binary representation
+ * file.
+ */
+int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	unsigned int i, num_syms;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	u32 config;
+	size_t len;
+	struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+
+	/*
+	 * refuse to write policy older than compressed avtab
+	 * to simplify the writer.  There are other tests dropped
+	 * since we assume this throughout the writer code.  Be
+	 * careful if you ever try to remove this restriction
+	 */
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
+		       "  Because it is less than version %d\n", p->policyvers,
+		       POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	config = 0;
+	if (p->mls_enabled)
+		config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
+
+	if (p->reject_unknown)
+		config |= REJECT_UNKNOWN;
+	if (p->allow_unknown)
+		config |= ALLOW_UNKNOWN;
+
+	/* Write the magic number and string identifiers. */
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+	len = strlen(POLICYDB_STRING);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = put_entry(POLICYDB_STRING, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Write the version, config, and table sizes. */
+	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+	if (!info) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
+		    "version %d", p->policyvers);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->policyvers);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(config);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(info->sym_num);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(info->ocon_num);
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&p->policycaps, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	num_syms = info->sym_num;
+	for (i = 0; i < num_syms; i++) {
+		struct policy_data pd;
+
+		pd.fp = fp;
+		pd.p = p;
+
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].nprim);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].table->nel);
+
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		rc = hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, write_f[i], &pd);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = avtab_write(p, &p->te_avtab, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = cond_write_list(p, p->cond_list, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = role_trans_write(p->role_tr, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = role_allow_write(p->role_allow, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = genfs_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = range_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+		struct ebitmap *e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
+
+		BUG_ON(!e);
+		rc = ebitmap_write(e, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}

security/selinux/ss/policydb.h

@@ -254,6 +254,9 @@ struct policydb {
 
 	struct ebitmap permissive_map;
 
+	/* length of this policy when it was loaded */
+	size_t len;
+
 	unsigned int policyvers;
 
 	unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
@@ -270,6 +273,7 @@ extern int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class);
 extern int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type);
 extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
 extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
 
 #define PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE 32
 
@@ -290,6 +294,11 @@ struct policy_file {
 	size_t len;
 };
 
+struct policy_data {
+	struct policydb *p;
+	void *fp;
+};
+
 static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
 {
 	if (bytes > fp->len)
@@ -301,6 +310,17 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int put_entry(void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	size_t len = bytes * num;
+
+	memcpy(fp->data, buf, len);
+	fp->data += len;
+	fp->len -= len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
 extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
 

security/selinux/ss/services.c

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 
 #include "flask.h"
@@ -991,7 +992,8 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
 {
 	char *scontextp;
 
-	*scontext = NULL;
+	if (scontext)
+		*scontext = NULL;
 	*scontext_len = 0;
 
 	if (context->len) {
@@ -1008,6 +1010,9 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
 	*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
 	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
 
+	if (!scontext)
+		return 0;
+
 	/* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
 	scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!scontextp)
@@ -1047,7 +1052,8 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
 	struct context *context;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	*scontext = NULL;
+	if (scontext)
+		*scontext = NULL;
 	*scontext_len  = 0;
 
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
@@ -1055,6 +1061,8 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
 			char *scontextp;
 
 			*scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
+			if (!scontext)
+				goto out;
 			scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (!scontextp) {
 				rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1769,6 +1777,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 			return rc;
 		}
 
+		policydb.len = len;
 		rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
 					 &current_mapping,
 					 &current_mapping_size);
@@ -1791,6 +1800,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 		selinux_complete_init();
 		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
 		selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
 		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 		return 0;
@@ -1804,6 +1814,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	newpolicydb.len = len;
 	/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
 	if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
@@ -1870,6 +1881,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 
 	avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+	selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
 	selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
 	selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 
@@ -1883,6 +1895,17 @@ err:
 
 }
 
+size_t security_policydb_len(void)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	len = policydb.len;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	return len;
+}
+
 /**
  * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
  * @protocol: protocol number
@@ -2374,6 +2397,7 @@ out:
 	if (!rc) {
 		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
 		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 	}
 	return rc;
@@ -3129,3 +3153,38 @@ netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure:
 	return rc;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/**
+ * security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+int security_read_policy(void **data, ssize_t *len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct policy_file fp;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*len = security_policydb_len();
+
+	*data = vmalloc_user(*len);
+	if (!*data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fp.data = *data;
+	fp.len = *len;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;
+	return 0;
+
+}

security/selinux/ss/status.c

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/*
+ * mmap based event notifications for SELinux
+ *
+ * Author: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 NEC corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * The selinux_status_page shall be exposed to userspace applications
+ * using mmap interface on /selinux/status.
+ * It enables to notify applications a few events that will cause reset
+ * of userspace access vector without context switching.
+ *
+ * The selinux_kernel_status structure on the head of status page is
+ * protected from concurrent accesses using seqlock logic, so userspace
+ * application should reference the status page according to the seqlock
+ * logic.
+ *
+ * Typically, application checks status->sequence at the head of access
+ * control routine. If it is odd-number, kernel is updating the status,
+ * so please wait for a moment. If it is changed from the last sequence
+ * number, it means something happen, so application will reset userspace
+ * avc, if needed.
+ * In most cases, application shall confirm the kernel status is not
+ * changed without any system call invocations.
+ */
+static struct page *selinux_status_page;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(selinux_status_lock);
+
+/*
+ * selinux_kernel_status_page
+ *
+ * It returns a reference to selinux_status_page. If the status page is
+ * not allocated yet, it also tries to allocate it at the first time.
+ */
+struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+	struct page		       *result = NULL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	if (!selinux_status_page) {
+		selinux_status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
+
+		if (selinux_status_page) {
+			status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+
+			status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
+			status->sequence = 0;
+			status->enforcing = selinux_enforcing;
+			/*
+			 * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set
+			 * a positive value on the status->policyload,
+			 * although it may not be 1, but never zero.
+			 * So, application can know it was updated.
+			 */
+			status->policyload = 0;
+			status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+		}
+	}
+	result = selinux_status_page;
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_setenforce
+ *
+ * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
+{
+	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	if (selinux_status_page) {
+		status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+
+		status->sequence++;
+		smp_wmb();
+
+		status->enforcing = enforcing;
+
+		smp_wmb();
+		status->sequence++;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_policyload
+ *
+ * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current
+ * setting of deny_unknown.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno)
+{
+	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	if (selinux_status_page) {
+		status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+
+		status->sequence++;
+		smp_wmb();
+
+		status->policyload = seqno;
+		status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+
+		smp_wmb();
+		status->sequence++;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+}

security/smack/smack_lsm.c

@@ -1281,12 +1281,11 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
  *
  * Return 0 if read access is permitted
  */
-static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
-				   struct sched_param *lp)
+static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
 	return rc;
@@ -3005,7 +3004,8 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid);
 
-	*secdata = sp;
+	if (secdata)
+		*secdata = sp;
 	*seclen = strlen(sp);
 	return 0;
 }

security/tomoyo/common.c

@@ -768,8 +768,10 @@ static bool tomoyo_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *data)
 		return true; /* Do nothing if open(O_WRONLY). */
 	memset(&head->r, 0, sizeof(head->r));
 	head->r.print_this_domain_only = true;
-	head->r.eof = !domain;
-	head->r.domain = &domain->list;
+	if (domain)
+		head->r.domain = &domain->list;
+	else
+		head->r.eof = 1;
 	tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data);
 	if (domain && domain->is_deleted)
 		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n");
@@ -2051,13 +2053,22 @@ void tomoyo_check_profile(void)
 		const u8 profile = domain->profile;
 		if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile])
 			continue;
+		printk(KERN_ERR "You need to define profile %u before using it.\n",
+		       profile);
+		printk(KERN_ERR "Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/ "
+		       "for more information.\n");
 		panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n",
 		      profile, domain->domainname->name);
 	}
 	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
-	if (tomoyo_profile_version != 20090903)
+	if (tomoyo_profile_version != 20090903) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "You need to install userland programs for "
+		       "TOMOYO 2.3 and initialize policy configuration.\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/ "
+		       "for more information.\n");
 		panic("Profile version %u is not supported.\n",
 		      tomoyo_profile_version);
+	}
 	printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.3.0\n");
 	printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n");
 }