Fix ACC_MODE() for real

commit 5300990c0370e804e49d9a59d928c5d53fb73487 had stepped on a rather
nasty mess: definitions of ACC_MODE used to be different.  Fixed the
resulting breakage, converting them to variant that takes O_... value;
all callers have that and it actually simplifies life (see tomoyo part
of changes).

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

fs/namei.c

@@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, const char *pathname,
 		open_flag |= O_DSYNC;
 
 	if (!acc_mode)
-		acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(flag);
+		acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(open_flag);
 
 	/* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
 	if (flag & O_TRUNC)

include/linux/fs.h

@@ -2463,7 +2463,7 @@ int proc_nr_files(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 
 int __init get_filesystem_list(char *buf);
 
-#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
+#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
 #define OPEN_FMODE(flag) ((__force fmode_t)((flag + 1) & O_ACCMODE))
 
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */

security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c

@@ -80,9 +80,8 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		return tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
 	/*
 	 * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
-	 * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
 	 */
-	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, 1);
+	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, O_RDONLY);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
@@ -184,10 +183,6 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	int flags = f->f_flags;
-
-	if ((flags + 1) & O_ACCMODE)
-		flags++;
-	flags |= f->f_flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC);
 	/* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
 	if (current->in_execve)
 		return 0;