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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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/*
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* linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c
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*
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- * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
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+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
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@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/highmem.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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+#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
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#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
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@@ -58,13 +59,13 @@ krb5_encrypt(
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{
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u32 ret = -EINVAL;
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struct scatterlist sg[1];
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- u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
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+ u8 local_iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE] = {0};
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struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = tfm, .info = local_iv };
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if (length % crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0)
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goto out;
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- if (crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > 16) {
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+ if (crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE) {
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dprintk("RPC: gss_k5encrypt: tfm iv size too large %d\n",
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crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm));
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goto out;
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@@ -92,13 +93,13 @@ krb5_decrypt(
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{
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u32 ret = -EINVAL;
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struct scatterlist sg[1];
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- u8 local_iv[16] = {0};
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+ u8 local_iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE] = {0};
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struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = tfm, .info = local_iv };
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if (length % crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0)
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goto out;
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- if (crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > 16) {
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+ if (crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE) {
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dprintk("RPC: gss_k5decrypt: tfm iv size too large %d\n",
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crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm));
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goto out;
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@@ -123,21 +124,155 @@ checksummer(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
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return crypto_hash_update(desc, sg, sg->length);
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}
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-/* checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header */
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-s32
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-make_checksum(char *cksumname, char *header, int hdrlen, struct xdr_buf *body,
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- int body_offset, struct xdr_netobj *cksum)
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+static int
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+arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt(unsigned int usage, u8 salt[4])
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+{
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+ unsigned int ms_usage;
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+
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+ switch (usage) {
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+ case KG_USAGE_SIGN:
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+ ms_usage = 15;
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+ break;
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+ case KG_USAGE_SEAL:
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+ ms_usage = 13;
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ return EINVAL;;
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+ }
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+ salt[0] = (ms_usage >> 0) & 0xff;
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+ salt[1] = (ms_usage >> 8) & 0xff;
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+ salt[2] = (ms_usage >> 16) & 0xff;
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+ salt[3] = (ms_usage >> 24) & 0xff;
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+
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+static u32
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+make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
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+ struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
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+ unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
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{
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- struct hash_desc desc; /* XXX add to ctx? */
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+ struct hash_desc desc;
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struct scatterlist sg[1];
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int err;
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+ u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
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+ u8 rc4salt[4];
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+ struct crypto_hash *md5;
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+ struct crypto_hash *hmac_md5;
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+
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+ if (cksumkey == NULL)
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+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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+
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+ if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) {
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+ dprintk("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n",
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+ __func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name);
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+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt(usage, rc4salt)) {
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+ dprintk("%s: invalid usage value %u\n", __func__, usage);
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+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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+ }
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+
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+ md5 = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
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+ if (IS_ERR(md5))
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+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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+
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+ hmac_md5 = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0,
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+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
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+ if (IS_ERR(hmac_md5)) {
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+ crypto_free_hash(md5);
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+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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+ }
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+
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+ desc.tfm = md5;
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+ desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
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+
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+ err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+ sg_init_one(sg, rc4salt, 4);
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+ err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, 4);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen);
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+ err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, hdrlen);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+ err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
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+ checksummer, &desc);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+ err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, checksumdata);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ desc.tfm = hmac_md5;
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+ desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
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+
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+ err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+ err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac_md5, cksumkey, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ sg_init_one(sg, checksumdata, crypto_hash_digestsize(md5));
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+ err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, crypto_hash_digestsize(md5),
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+ checksumdata);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
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+ cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
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+out:
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+ crypto_free_hash(md5);
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+ crypto_free_hash(hmac_md5);
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+ return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header
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+ * The checksum is performed over the first 8 bytes of the
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+ * gss token header and then over the data body
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+ */
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+u32
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+make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
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+ struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
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+ unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
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+{
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+ struct hash_desc desc;
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+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
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+ int err;
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+ u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
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+ unsigned int checksumlen;
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+
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+ if (kctx->gk5e->ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR)
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+ return make_checksum_hmac_md5(kctx, header, hdrlen,
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+ body, body_offset,
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+ cksumkey, usage, cksumout);
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+
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+ if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) {
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+ dprintk("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n",
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+ __func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name);
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+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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+ }
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- desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(cksumname, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
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+ desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
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if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm))
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return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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- cksum->len = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm);
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desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
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+ checksumlen = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm);
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+
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+ if (cksumkey != NULL) {
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+ err = crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, cksumkey,
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+ kctx->gk5e->keylength);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+
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err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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@@ -149,15 +284,109 @@ make_checksum(char *cksumname, char *header, int hdrlen, struct xdr_buf *body,
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checksummer, &desc);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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- err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data);
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+ err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, checksumdata);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+ switch (kctx->gk5e->ctype) {
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+ case CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5:
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+ err = kctx->gk5e->encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, checksumdata,
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+ checksumdata, checksumlen);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+ memcpy(cksumout->data,
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+ checksumdata + checksumlen - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength,
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+ kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
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+ break;
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+ case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3:
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+ memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ BUG();
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
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+out:
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+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
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+ return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header
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+ * Per rfc4121, sec. 4.2.4, the checksum is performed over the data
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+ * body then over the first 16 octets of the MIC token
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+ * Inclusion of the header data in the calculation of the
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+ * checksum is optional.
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+ */
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+u32
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+make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
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+ struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
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+ unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
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+{
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+ struct hash_desc desc;
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+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
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+ int err;
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+ u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
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+ unsigned int checksumlen;
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+
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+ if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum == 0) {
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+ dprintk("%s: expected keyed hash for %s\n",
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+ __func__, kctx->gk5e->name);
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+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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+ }
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+ if (cksumkey == NULL) {
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+ dprintk("%s: no key supplied for %s\n",
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+ __func__, kctx->gk5e->name);
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+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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+ }
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+
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+ desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0,
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+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
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+ if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm))
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+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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+ checksumlen = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm);
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+ desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
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+
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+ err = crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, cksumkey, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+ err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
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+ checksummer, &desc);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+ if (header != NULL) {
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+ sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen);
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+ err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, hdrlen);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+ err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, checksumdata);
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+ if (err)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
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+
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+ switch (kctx->gk5e->ctype) {
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+ case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128:
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+ case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256:
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+ /* note that this truncates the hash */
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+ memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ BUG();
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+ break;
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+ }
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out:
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crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
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return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
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}
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struct encryptor_desc {
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- u8 iv[8]; /* XXX hard-coded blocksize */
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+ u8 iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
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struct blkcipher_desc desc;
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int pos;
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struct xdr_buf *outbuf;
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@@ -198,7 +427,7 @@ encryptor(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
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desc->fraglen += sg->length;
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desc->pos += sg->length;
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- fraglen = thislen & 7; /* XXX hardcoded blocksize */
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+ fraglen = thislen & (crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(desc->desc.tfm) - 1);
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thislen -= fraglen;
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if (thislen == 0)
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@@ -256,7 +485,7 @@ gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf,
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}
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struct decryptor_desc {
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- u8 iv[8]; /* XXX hard-coded blocksize */
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+ u8 iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
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struct blkcipher_desc desc;
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struct scatterlist frags[4];
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int fragno;
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@@ -278,7 +507,7 @@ decryptor(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
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desc->fragno++;
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desc->fraglen += sg->length;
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- fraglen = thislen & 7; /* XXX hardcoded blocksize */
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+ fraglen = thislen & (crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(desc->desc.tfm) - 1);
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thislen -= fraglen;
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if (thislen == 0)
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@@ -325,3 +554,437 @@ gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf,
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return xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, decryptor, &desc);
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}
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+
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+/*
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+ * This function makes the assumption that it was ultimately called
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+ * from gss_wrap().
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+ *
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+ * The client auth_gss code moves any existing tail data into a
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+ * separate page before calling gss_wrap.
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+ * The server svcauth_gss code ensures that both the head and the
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+ * tail have slack space of RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE before calling gss_wrap.
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+ *
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+ * Even with that guarantee, this function may be called more than
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+ * once in the processing of gss_wrap(). The best we can do is
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+ * verify at compile-time (see GSS_KRB5_SLACK_CHECK) that the
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+ * largest expected shift will fit within RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE.
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+ * At run-time we can verify that a single invocation of this
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+ * function doesn't attempt to use more the RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE.
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+ */
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+
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+int
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+xdr_extend_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int base, unsigned int shiftlen)
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+{
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+ u8 *p;
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+
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+ if (shiftlen == 0)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ BUILD_BUG_ON(GSS_KRB5_MAX_SLACK_NEEDED > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE);
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+ BUG_ON(shiftlen > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE);
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+
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|
|
+ p = buf->head[0].iov_base + base;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memmove(p + shiftlen, p, buf->head[0].iov_len - base);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ buf->head[0].iov_len += shiftlen;
|
|
|
+ buf->len += shiftlen;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static u32
|
|
|
+gss_krb5_cts_crypt(struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher, struct xdr_buf *buf,
|
|
|
+ u32 offset, u8 *iv, struct page **pages, int encrypt)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ u32 ret;
|
|
|
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
|
|
|
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = cipher, .info = iv };
|
|
|
+ u8 data[crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(cipher) * 2];
|
|
|
+ struct page **save_pages;
|
|
|
+ u32 len = buf->len - offset;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ BUG_ON(len > crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(cipher) * 2);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * For encryption, we want to read from the cleartext
|
|
|
+ * page cache pages, and write the encrypted data to
|
|
|
+ * the supplied xdr_buf pages.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ save_pages = buf->pages;
|
|
|
+ if (encrypt)
|
|
|
+ buf->pages = pages;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len);
|
|
|
+ buf->pages = save_pages;
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (encrypt)
|
|
|
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&desc, sg, sg, len);
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&desc, sg, sg, len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ret = write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+out:
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+u32
|
|
|
+gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
|
|
|
+ struct xdr_buf *buf, int ec, struct page **pages)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ u32 err;
|
|
|
+ struct xdr_netobj hmac;
|
|
|
+ u8 *cksumkey;
|
|
|
+ u8 *ecptr;
|
|
|
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher;
|
|
|
+ int blocksize;
|
|
|
+ struct page **save_pages;
|
|
|
+ int nblocks, nbytes;
|
|
|
+ struct encryptor_desc desc;
|
|
|
+ u32 cbcbytes;
|
|
|
+ unsigned int usage;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (kctx->initiate) {
|
|
|
+ cipher = kctx->initiator_enc;
|
|
|
+ aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux;
|
|
|
+ cksumkey = kctx->initiator_integ;
|
|
|
+ usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc;
|
|
|
+ aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux;
|
|
|
+ cksumkey = kctx->acceptor_integ;
|
|
|
+ usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(cipher);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* hide the gss token header and insert the confounder */
|
|
|
+ offset += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
|
|
|
+ if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, kctx->gk5e->conflen))
|
|
|
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
|
|
|
+ gss_krb5_make_confounder(buf->head[0].iov_base + offset, kctx->gk5e->conflen);
|
|
|
+ offset -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (buf->tail[0].iov_base != NULL) {
|
|
|
+ ecptr = buf->tail[0].iov_base + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ buf->tail[0].iov_base = buf->head[0].iov_base
|
|
|
+ + buf->head[0].iov_len;
|
|
|
+ buf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
|
|
|
+ ecptr = buf->tail[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memset(ecptr, 'X', ec);
|
|
|
+ buf->tail[0].iov_len += ec;
|
|
|
+ buf->len += ec;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* copy plaintext gss token header after filler (if any) */
|
|
|
+ memcpy(ecptr + ec, buf->head[0].iov_base + offset,
|
|
|
+ GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN);
|
|
|
+ buf->tail[0].iov_len += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
|
|
|
+ buf->len += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Do the HMAC */
|
|
|
+ hmac.len = GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN;
|
|
|
+ hmac.data = buf->tail[0].iov_base + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * When we are called, pages points to the real page cache
|
|
|
+ * data -- which we can't go and encrypt! buf->pages points
|
|
|
+ * to scratch pages which we are going to send off to the
|
|
|
+ * client/server. Swap in the plaintext pages to calculate
|
|
|
+ * the hmac.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ save_pages = buf->pages;
|
|
|
+ buf->pages = pages;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = make_checksum_v2(kctx, NULL, 0, buf,
|
|
|
+ offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
|
|
|
+ cksumkey, usage, &hmac);
|
|
|
+ buf->pages = save_pages;
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ nbytes = buf->len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
|
|
|
+ nblocks = (nbytes + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
|
|
|
+ cbcbytes = 0;
|
|
|
+ if (nblocks > 2)
|
|
|
+ cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (cbcbytes) {
|
|
|
+ desc.pos = offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
|
|
|
+ desc.fragno = 0;
|
|
|
+ desc.fraglen = 0;
|
|
|
+ desc.pages = pages;
|
|
|
+ desc.outbuf = buf;
|
|
|
+ desc.desc.info = desc.iv;
|
|
|
+ desc.desc.flags = 0;
|
|
|
+ desc.desc.tfm = aux_cipher;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sg_init_table(desc.infrags, 4);
|
|
|
+ sg_init_table(desc.outfrags, 4);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
|
|
|
+ cbcbytes, encryptor, &desc);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Make sure IV carries forward from any CBC results. */
|
|
|
+ err = gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cipher, buf,
|
|
|
+ offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + cbcbytes,
|
|
|
+ desc.iv, pages, 1);
|
|
|
+ if (err) {
|
|
|
+ err = GSS_S_FAILURE;
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Now update buf to account for HMAC */
|
|
|
+ buf->tail[0].iov_len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
|
|
|
+ buf->len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+out_err:
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ err = GSS_S_FAILURE;
|
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+u32
|
|
|
+gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf,
|
|
|
+ u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct xdr_buf subbuf;
|
|
|
+ u32 ret = 0;
|
|
|
+ u8 *cksum_key;
|
|
|
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher;
|
|
|
+ struct xdr_netobj our_hmac_obj;
|
|
|
+ u8 our_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
|
|
|
+ u8 pkt_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
|
|
|
+ int nblocks, blocksize, cbcbytes;
|
|
|
+ struct decryptor_desc desc;
|
|
|
+ unsigned int usage;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (kctx->initiate) {
|
|
|
+ cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc;
|
|
|
+ aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux;
|
|
|
+ cksum_key = kctx->acceptor_integ;
|
|
|
+ usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ cipher = kctx->initiator_enc;
|
|
|
+ aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux;
|
|
|
+ cksum_key = kctx->initiator_integ;
|
|
|
+ usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(cipher);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* create a segment skipping the header and leaving out the checksum */
|
|
|
+ xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
|
|
|
+ (buf->len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN -
|
|
|
+ kctx->gk5e->cksumlength));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ nblocks = (subbuf.len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ cbcbytes = 0;
|
|
|
+ if (nblocks > 2)
|
|
|
+ cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (cbcbytes) {
|
|
|
+ desc.fragno = 0;
|
|
|
+ desc.fraglen = 0;
|
|
|
+ desc.desc.info = desc.iv;
|
|
|
+ desc.desc.flags = 0;
|
|
|
+ desc.desc.tfm = aux_cipher;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sg_init_table(desc.frags, 4);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ret = xdr_process_buf(&subbuf, 0, cbcbytes, decryptor, &desc);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Make sure IV carries forward from any CBC results. */
|
|
|
+ ret = gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cipher, &subbuf, cbcbytes, desc.iv, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Calculate our hmac over the plaintext data */
|
|
|
+ our_hmac_obj.len = sizeof(our_hmac);
|
|
|
+ our_hmac_obj.data = our_hmac;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ret = make_checksum_v2(kctx, NULL, 0, &subbuf, 0,
|
|
|
+ cksum_key, usage, &our_hmac_obj);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Get the packet's hmac value */
|
|
|
+ ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength,
|
|
|
+ pkt_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (memcmp(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) {
|
|
|
+ ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ *headskip = kctx->gk5e->conflen;
|
|
|
+ *tailskip = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
|
|
|
+out_err:
|
|
|
+ if (ret && ret != GSS_S_BAD_SIG)
|
|
|
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Compute Kseq given the initial session key and the checksum.
|
|
|
+ * Set the key of the given cipher.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *cksum)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct crypto_hash *hmac;
|
|
|
+ struct hash_desc desc;
|
|
|
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
|
|
|
+ u8 Kseq[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN];
|
|
|
+ u32 zeroconstant = 0;
|
|
|
+ int err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ dprintk("%s: entered\n", __func__);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ hmac = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
|
|
|
+ if (IS_ERR(hmac)) {
|
|
|
+ dprintk("%s: error %ld, allocating hash '%s'\n",
|
|
|
+ __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), kctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
|
|
|
+ return PTR_ERR(hmac);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ desc.tfm = hmac;
|
|
|
+ desc.flags = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Compute intermediate Kseq from session key */
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac, kctx->Ksess, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sg_init_table(sg, 1);
|
|
|
+ sg_set_buf(sg, &zeroconstant, 4);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, 4, Kseq);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Compute final Kseq from the checksum and intermediate Kseq */
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac, Kseq, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sg_set_buf(sg, cksum, 8);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, 8, Kseq);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(cipher, Kseq, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+out_err:
|
|
|
+ crypto_free_hash(hmac);
|
|
|
+ dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
|
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Compute Kcrypt given the initial session key and the plaintext seqnum.
|
|
|
+ * Set the key of cipher kctx->enc.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher,
|
|
|
+ s32 seqnum)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct crypto_hash *hmac;
|
|
|
+ struct hash_desc desc;
|
|
|
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
|
|
|
+ u8 Kcrypt[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN];
|
|
|
+ u8 zeroconstant[4] = {0};
|
|
|
+ u8 seqnumarray[4];
|
|
|
+ int err, i;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ dprintk("%s: entered, seqnum %u\n", __func__, seqnum);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ hmac = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
|
|
|
+ if (IS_ERR(hmac)) {
|
|
|
+ dprintk("%s: error %ld, allocating hash '%s'\n",
|
|
|
+ __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), kctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
|
|
|
+ return PTR_ERR(hmac);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ desc.tfm = hmac;
|
|
|
+ desc.flags = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Compute intermediate Kcrypt from session key */
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < kctx->gk5e->keylength; i++)
|
|
|
+ Kcrypt[i] = kctx->Ksess[i] ^ 0xf0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sg_init_table(sg, 1);
|
|
|
+ sg_set_buf(sg, zeroconstant, 4);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, 4, Kcrypt);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Compute final Kcrypt from the seqnum and intermediate Kcrypt */
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ seqnumarray[0] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 24) & 0xff);
|
|
|
+ seqnumarray[1] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 16) & 0xff);
|
|
|
+ seqnumarray[2] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 8) & 0xff);
|
|
|
+ seqnumarray[3] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 0) & 0xff);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sg_set_buf(sg, seqnumarray, 4);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, 4, Kcrypt);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(cipher, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
|
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
|
+ goto out_err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ err = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+out_err:
|
|
|
+ crypto_free_hash(hmac);
|
|
|
+ dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
|
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|