|
@@ -238,7 +238,8 @@ void ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
|
|
|
int ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
|
|
|
struct ieee80211_key *key,
|
|
|
u8 *payload, size_t payload_len, u8 *ta,
|
|
|
- int only_iv, int queue)
|
|
|
+ int only_iv, int queue,
|
|
|
+ u32 *out_iv32, u16 *out_iv16)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
u32 iv32;
|
|
|
u32 iv16;
|
|
@@ -332,11 +333,14 @@ int ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
|
|
|
res = ieee80211_wep_decrypt_data(tfm, rc4key, 16, pos, payload_len - 12);
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
if (res == TKIP_DECRYPT_OK) {
|
|
|
- /* FIX: these should be updated only after Michael MIC has been
|
|
|
- * verified */
|
|
|
- /* Record previously received IV */
|
|
|
- key->u.tkip.iv32_rx[queue] = iv32;
|
|
|
- key->u.tkip.iv16_rx[queue] = iv16;
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Record previously received IV, will be copied into the
|
|
|
+ * key information after MIC verification. It is possible
|
|
|
+ * that we don't catch replays of fragments but that's ok
|
|
|
+ * because the Michael MIC verication will then fail.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ *out_iv32 = iv32;
|
|
|
+ *out_iv16 = iv16;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
return res;
|