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@@ -14,6 +14,20 @@ struct tcp_fastopen_context __rcu *tcp_fastopen_ctx;
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
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+void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish)
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+{
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+ static u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
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+
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+ /* tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher publishes the new context
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+ * atomically, so we allow this race happening here.
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+ *
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+ * All call sites of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen also check
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+ * for a valid cookie, so this is an acceptable risk.
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+ */
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+ if (net_get_random_once(key, sizeof(key)) && publish)
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+ tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
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+}
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+
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static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head)
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{
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struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx =
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@@ -70,6 +84,8 @@ void tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(__be32 src, __be32 dst,
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__be32 path[4] = { src, dst, 0, 0 };
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struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx;
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+ tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(true);
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+
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rcu_read_lock();
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ctx = rcu_dereference(tcp_fastopen_ctx);
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if (ctx) {
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@@ -78,14 +94,3 @@ void tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(__be32 src, __be32 dst,
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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}
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-
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-static int __init tcp_fastopen_init(void)
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-{
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- __u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
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-
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- get_random_bytes(key, sizeof(key));
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- tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
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- return 0;
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-}
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-
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-late_initcall(tcp_fastopen_init);
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